Introduction
Lawyers are not monads. Lawyers do form personal relationships with others.
Lawyers have families and they have friends, neighbours and acquaintances.
Formally, this realm of intimate relationships is meant to be separated from the professional role of the lawyer. Lawyers are meant to owe fidelity and loyalty to clients. However, this proposed neat distinction between the personal and professional facets of lawyers' lives does not always reflect the reality of what happens in practice.
It is well known that lawyers routinely act for friends and family. Lawyers often act for clients who originally were known to them as private acquaintances, and clients regularly choose lawyers on the recommendation of a mutual friend of both the client and lawyer. Lawyers also form friendships with their clients.
A strict adherence to the separation of personal and professional relationships might be damaging to lawyers. Taken to its extreme, such a separation does project the image of the lawyer as a monad shunning all social ties. A strong moratorium against mingling personal and professional ties, in conjunction with other negative pressures on lawyers, such as working hours and stress, could accelerate social isolation among the profession. 1 Legal ethics has not been entirely hostile to conjoining "friendship" and "clients". Indeed, Charles Fried in his influential 1976 article raised the analogy that lawyers are like friends.
Surely it is beneficial that lawyers have friends, and therefore conceivable that some of these friendships will result in lawyer/client relationships. 2 Fried's use of friendship was limited. He adopted friendship as an analogy to morally justify what we will call in this article the 'standard conception of lawyering'-the idea that the lawyer zealously pursues a client's interests within the formal limits of the law. 3 Fried postulated the lawyer as a "limited-purpose friend. A lawyer is a friend in regard to the legal system…That means that like a friend he acts in your interests, not his own; or rather he adopts your interests as his own." 4 Fried was not suggesting that lawyers be more friend-like, or offering a solution to whether a lawyer should act for a friend. Rather he tapped into the Western thinking on friendship originating from Aristotle's definition that a friend is one who selflessly acts for another. 5 Fried does not refer directly to Aristotle.
However, the structure of his discussion of friendship mirrors some of Aristotle's.
Like Aristotle, Fried sees the good of friendship as emanating from self-love. 6 Also
Fried can be seen as trying to enlist some of Aristotle's wholesome endorsement of friendship as a good in the argument for the good of lawyers to act zealously for clients. This assessment marks a fault-line in the Western reflection on friendship. For
Aristotle friendship grounds male fraternity and forms polis 7 , while for Cicero the personal ties of friendship were considered corrosive to public life. 8 Fried's enlisting of friendship to justify the standard conception of lawyering has not gone unchallenged. Dauer and Leff concluded that it is a strange friend that commits to forwarding or protecting "the interests of a client…so long as he is paid a sufficient amount to do so, and so long as doing so does not inflict any material unforeseen personal costs". 9 Irrespective of this, the client-care literature of the past 20 years has urged lawyers to be more "friend-like" in client relationships. 10 The concept of "friendship" has therefore been deployed in contemporary thinking about lawyering. However, legal ethicists have rarely reflected on the basic dilemma of whether lawyers should act for friends, beyond acknowledging that friendship can test the boundaries between professional duties and private obligations.
The focus of this article is on this very boundary of lawyering and friendship and of professional duties and private obligations. Its case study is a situation where the actions of a lawyer and others were subject to an investigation by the Queensland
Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) surrounding political donations in a local government election. While the parties involved were eventually cleared of breaches under the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld), and therefore of any illegality, the circumstances in which the lawyer was operating raise questions about the nature of contemporary legal practice and the complexities of friendship and lawyering. In recognising the sensitivity of the subject matter and to protect those involved, it is proposed that those involved will simply be referred to as "Lawyer", "Friend", "Councillors 1 and 2", and "Concerned Citizen".
This article is neither an apologia for Lawyer's actions, nor is it seeking to condemn Lawyer from our not-quite ivory and not-very-tall tower.
11
What follows is in three parts. The first part outlines the context in which Lawyer was acting. Next, the article asks whether Lawyer's actions were justifiable in light of three normative accounts of lawyering: the 'standard conception''
Instead we approach the CMC inquiry, report and subsequent Magistrate and District Court decisions as a case study of a "real world" dilemma for lawyers. Our intention is to use this case study as a contemporary focus for working through how lawyers should respond to situations where they face, on a daily basis, conflicting professional and personal obligations. 
The Council Election
The subject of the CMC inquiry into the council election focused on the existence and management of a fund supporting the campaign of specific candidates. Lawyer set up the fund as a trust account fund ostensibly for Councillor 1 and 2 and then later Concerned Citizen, but really at the request of Friend. The fund was used to support the campaign for election of certain pro-development candidates.
The CMC was of the opinion that the fund had its origins in the confluence of two related anxieties. The first was the perceived difficulty that some councillors experienced in working with, in their terms, three "anti-development" councillors.
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The second was a concern among property developers that the growing influence of environmental groups might be strengthened by the election of more "wild-card"
councillors. 16 The fear was that the election may produce a council that would be unsympathetic to development. The CMC found that the fund was orchestrated by Councillors 1 and 2 (Councillor 2-since deceased) and Friend, who was a local developer (and also since deceased). The aim of the fund was to directly support "sensible"
The CMC found that while Friend was involved in setting up the fund, and was active in soliciting donations from other developers, it was Councillor 1 who exercised control over the fund. 18 The CMC was of the opinion that the key characteristic of the fund's management was secrecy. 19 This conclusion of the CMC was based on their finding that Councillors 1 and 2 and recipient candidates had repeatedly gone on the public record as denying any knowledge of the existence of the fund, and its goal of supporting a "bloc" of pro-development candidates. 20 While at this level the fund and its management tell a story about the problems of "representation" within local government in Australia, 21 The fundamental fact was that Lawyer and Friend had a long and well-known personal relationship.
the inquiry and report very clearly present to lawyers and law students alike a very "real world" snapshot of some wider dimensions relevant to the lawyer/client relationship. 22 Lawyer acknowledged this repeatedly in his evidence before the CMC. He had acted for Friend for 15 years, 23 and he freely admitted to the inquiry that he became involved with the fund at Friend's request. 24 Lawyer even explained his actions in friendship terms, that his involvement was a "contribution"; 25 that he was, at Friend's request, doing Friend "a favour"; 26 and that he "would never charge a fee" for his involvement with the fund. 27 According to the report and the inquiry transcript, Friend's association with Instead, in the next section it engages in an in-depth examination of whether Lawyer's actions were justifiable according to three normative theoretical accounts of lawyering. 38 Needham, supra n. 15, 109. The CMC was not misled for long. During sentencing the defence emphasised that within four days after the submission of the "composite" document enough primary documents were with the CMC for it to be aware of the involvement of [67] , [69] . 41 Ibid, per Shanahan DCJ at [69] . 42 Defined by the "standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner", Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld), ss. 244, 245(1)(a). 43 Defined as including conduct that amounts to "a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence". 
Were Lawyer's Actions Justifiable?
Generally speaking there is a widely held view, whether real or imagined, that the standard of lawyer conduct generally is declining, which in turn has brought about the perceived decline in the status of lawyers in the wider community. 44 In It must be kept in mind that the District Court did not share the CMC's interpretation of these facts, and found, as has been noted, that Lawyer did not actively attempt to suppress the involvement of Councillors 1 and 2. What is significant for our purposes is that the Lawyer at the inquiry justified his actions in standard conception terms. He explained his failure to inform Councillors 1 and 2 of their potential obligations by saying, "I wasn't asked to advise them and I didn't want to have to give them any advice on those matters at all".
The third was the preparation of Concerned Citizen's return that did not include the names of Councillors 1 and 2.
The fourth was the submission of the trust account to the CMC. 62 Similarly, Lawyer adopted standard conception rhetoric in defence of his actions surrounding the changing of the account. He told the CMC that he was disinterested in the change and did not ask for an explanation; that all he was doing was ensuring that "there's a trust account being managed in a proper legal way in accordance with their directions and that was it", 63 and "[a]lways a solicitor acting for a client acts in accordance with directions and
that's what I did". 64 59 Needham, supra n. 15, xxiii.
Under the standard conception a lawyer's actions are justifiable if they accord with the client's interests, regardless of how "immoral" those interests might appear to bodies like the CMC. Indeed, the CMC found that the actions of those involved with the fund were contrary to its understanding of the legislation's desired goals of transparency and accountability in local government elections; however, it was of the opinion that no laws were broken. Instead, the CMC recommended a process of cultural change: "elected officials and public officers [need] to be willing to take a healthy attitude towards compliance obligations, rather than looking for loopholes to avoid them". In his evidence to the CMC, Lawyer suggested that there was no lawyer-client relationship between himself and Concerned Citizen; that he was not providing legal advice. 70 Concerning the third-party return, Lawyer stated that he provided the document to Concerned Citizen, but did not advise Concerned Citizen about it.
Indeed, he implied that he did not know whether the submitted return was exactly the same as the one he provided, not having seen the submitted return. 71 Yet, in our opinion, the listing of Concerned Citizen's name on the trust account meant that he was Lawyer's client. Therefore, in not advising Concerned
Citizen and in preparing a document that could be argued to be misleading, Concerned Citizen was exposed to the possibility of prosecution. 72 Indeed, the CMC did recommend Concerned Citizen to the relevant state government department to be considered for prosecution. 73 It is difficult in these circumstances to see Lawyer as furthering Concerned Citizen's interests. According to the standard conception, such action by a lawyer is not justifiable. Lawyer can be seen as prioritising the interests of some clients (Councillors 1 and 2) over those of another client (Concerned Citizen).
The reason why Lawyer did not see Concerned Citizen as a "true client" was that Lawyer seemed to be prioritising the interests of Friend. 74 Indeed, Lawyer was only involved in the fund at Friend's request. 75 The initial appointment of Councillors 1 and 2 as clients was made with Friend's approval, 76 and therefore facilitated his desire not to be "formally" identified with the fund. 77 Lawyer was able to approach other developers for contributions because he was regarded within the developer community as Friend's lawyer. 78 Indeed, in this light even Councillors 1 and 2 can be seen as only "quasi-clients", with Friend residing in the background as the actual
client. Lawyer seems to admit this when he responded affirmatively to Counsel
Assisting the Commission's question-"[a]nd so far as being clients of yours…that was really for convenience sake only?" 79 When asked why he had not suggested
Friend as the client to be nominated on the trust account, Lawyer said that he did not think that was appropriate. The whole thrust of Lawyer's evidence was that he was involved in the fund because of his association with Friend. Lawyer, when he was recalled to give evidence, steadfastly asserted that he had not provided legal advice to Councillors 1 and 2, or to Concerned Citizen. 81 The reality seems to be that Friend was the "true client" and the level of service Lawyer provided to the others was conditional on whether or not their interests were aligned with those of Friend-the election of a development friendly council. 82 This seemed to have resulted in Lawyer working for Councillors 1 and 2 and explains his failure to assist Concerned Citizen with the third-party return. Tim Dare has recently coined the phrase "hyper-zealous" to cover lawyer behaviour like Lawyer's. 83 Lawyer appears, with regard to his actions for his "true client", to be the epitome of the standard conception lawyer throughout:
"The Lawyers' role in this system is that of the agent of the client and therefore their behaviour in handling the matter is of small importance." 84 However, the standard conception in its picture of the lawyer as zealously pursuing a client's interests within the formal limits of the law, unperturbed by notions of personal morality, has been highly criticised within the legal ethics project.
It has been criticised as engaging in a fundamental Cartesian error of separating outer and inner life and opening lawyers up to personal malaise. 85 It has been identified as the reason for a perceived decline in the social status of lawyering, 86 and in key public controversies, lawyers acting according to the standard conception have been heavily criticised as allowing, and even facilitating, fundamental attacks on the public good. 87 Indeed, the CMC seems to have placed the Council Election within this last category when it referred to the participants involved with the fund, including
Lawyer, as possessing no conception of the public good; as operating in a "Wonderland". Notwithstanding the Commissioner's criticism, the question whether Lawyer's actions are justifiable according to some of the alternative accounts of Lawyering remains unanswered. Common to these alternatives is the fundamental realisation that lawyering takes place within all the eventualities of life and therefore calls for a certain amount of accountability from lawyers with regard to their decisions about their own conduct and the advice they give to clients.
Common Morality
Luban criticises the role morality of the standard conception as amounting to "an institutional excuse from the requirements of common morality". 89 He refuses to believe that people are just the "sum" of their roles, 90 and maintains that there is a moral self "behind the social mask". 91 Acknowledging that there will be times when an individual's common morality will conflict with role morality, he asserts that common morality should prevail. 92 He defines common morality as "morality concerned with how persons behave". 93 In his definition Luban is careful not to subjectify morality as whatever set of values a person chooses to live by: Luban identifies a common set of values that are at the core of any person who lives in a community. 94 He describes the tension between common morality and role morality dramatically "as a clash between consequences and duty". 95 Having established common morality as a competitor to the standard conception's role morality, Luban goes on to prioritise common morality in all except criminal defence matters. 96 He advocates that lawyers ought to be moral activists, 97 who should operate in a way that accepts that role morality is a presumption that can be rebutted.
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Like the standard conception analysis, the application of Luban's account of role morality approach the moment he realised the likely consequences of the fund for the common good, namely the integrity of the election. However, this assumes that the fund was in fact likely to be corrosive to the election. Yet the actual result of the election does not seem to support this. While only some of the bloc candidates were elected, the three "obstructionist" councillors were re-elected. This also assumes that the fund was the only corrosion on the electoral process; at the time of the formation of the fund the Chamber of Commerce, Friend and other developers, and Councillors 1 and 2 were of the opinion that the election was going to be undermined by environmental organisations. Lawyer's actions in supporting the fund could be justified as providing a 'balance', and ensuring the common good of the election process.
Common morality could dictate that agents, in the circumstance of Lawyer,
should make it clear to all that Friend was his true principal. In the alternative, common morality could be conceived in Aristolean terms with friendship as the cornerstone of the fraternal good life, in which case Lawyer's acts for Friend seem justifiable. 99 However, this absolute valuing of friendship with the good is criticised by Cicero. For Cicero the dissolution of republican Roman into dictatorship was facilitated because civil virtue had been undermined by private accords between powerful "friends". 100 In the realm of common morality, even the issue surrounding the provision of documents to the CMC could become morally justifiable. At the inquiry Lawyer explained the return as an effort on his part to assist the common good of a public inquiry by giving the CMC exactly what they had asked for. 101 Lawyer's dealings with Concerned Citizen, however, appear not to be justifiable at all according to common morality. The harm to Concerned Citizen in While the CMC maintained, in the report, and in the hearings in the Magistrates' and District
Courts that this was a narrow interpretation of their request, Lawyer's understanding of the request was accepted by the District Court. In light of this, it is tempting to suggest that calls for common morality to displace role morality leads to a form of sophism with every argument for, balanced by an equally convincing counter argument. 99 Aristotle, supra n. 5, book 9, 1167a18. 100 Lynch, supra n. 8. 101 CMC Transcript (Day 23), supra n. 62, 2144, lines 42-48. In his answers Lawyer said that he interpreted the Commission's request to be one that required him to advise on who received the monies and he believed that he gave a very full disclosure of this information. He did not understand the Commission to be asking about who operated or who authorised the accounts.
exposing him to potential prosecution cannot be said to be outweighed by the political harm to Councillors 1 and 2 and Friend if it was publicly disclosed that Councillors 1 and 2 were in charge of the fund. This is especially so as it appeared that Councillor 1's relationship to the fund was common knowledge within elements of the community, 102 and was the subject of almost daily allegations and speculations within the media. 104 Although, in his more recent work, Luban seems to be refining his notion of common morality through an emphasis on personal integrity and the necessity of lawyers justifying their actions morally. 105 In this, Luban appears to be moving towards the normative account of lawyering offered by Shaffer and
Cochran.
Personal Integrity
The notion of personal integrity has become a common rallying point for much recent theorising within the legal ethics project.
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prioritises role morality to the exclusion of the personal, personal integrity emphasises the limits of role morality and the necessity that lawyers unify personal and professional morality. 107 Allan Hutchinson summarised it as the realisation that:
"…acting ethically is not about adherence to a code that is resorted to in occasional moments of indecision. Rather, it is about the development of a moral way of living and lawyering that encompasses an organic set of attitudes, dispositions, and values, and that can be incorporated into each lawyer's daily routines and regimen." Personal integrity theorists seek to navigate these concerns by providing a prescriptive set of values that are required for a life to be lived with integrity.
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One of the foundational accounts of lawyering as personal integrity is Shaffer However, as the case study shows, caution must be exercised when personal relationships develop into professional relationships. A negative impact on clients, non-clients and the public good can result. The case study is a fascinating example because it is not the expected situation of a lawyer acting for a friend as a formal client. Lawyer's commitment to Friend meant that he lost sight of who his clients were and what duties were owed, and this is the common conclusion from the three normative accounts of lawyering discussed. As a contextual approach it shows that lawyers need to exercise extreme care when asked to undertake professional activity at the behest of friends. A lawyer must retain a sense of distance, a space for reflection and assessment, concerning what is being asked and how that will impact on formal obligations.
This case study is a timely reminder for those involved in legal education and those currently practising. "Contextual" accounts of lawyering quite graphically show that future and current lawyers will need to develop the art or skill of using "practical reason" or "judgment" or, put another way, recognise that, for some decisions, a course of action that requires them to resort to an "integration of personal and professional morality" 127 is required. Law students and lawyers need to learn and practise reflecting. 128 They need to take seriously the task of nurturing the skills that will enable them to make justifiable decisions, and much of this will come from hearing and deliberating on examples of how other lawyers have negotiated specific and complex situations. What we hope is that Lawyer's actions as documented in the transcript of the CMC inquiry and the report provide a case study through which lawyers (and law students) can reflect on how they would respond to the demands of friendship in legal practice and the complexities of the lawyer-client relationship. It also shows how the daily decisions made by lawyers reveal scope for ethical reflection, and how choices made within that scope can be justified.
Conclusion
This article examines the actions of a lawyer, as documented in the CMC inquiry, as a case study for thinking about lawyer conduct. While Lawyer's actions were held to be legal, wider implications of his conduct are explored through a discussion of three accounts of lawyering: the standard conception, common morality and personal integrity. It seems that most of Lawyer's involvement in the scheme could be justified according to the standard conception, and even common morality. Both, however, also suggest that Lawyer's action, in exposing Concerned Citizen to possible criminal prosecution, was unjustifiable; although different explanations are offered.
When examining Lawyer's actions through the lens of recent scholarship on personal integrity, it is suggested that the proscription of specific virtue values by personal integrity scholarship led to an assessment of Lawyer's actions as unjustifiable. However, it is also suggested that inserting alternative values leads to more positive assessments.
In conclusion, it is suggested that Lawyer's actions show the complexities that Lawyer's conduct his actions became unjustifiable. Second, undertaking legal work borne out of friendship is a situation that must give lawyers cause to pause and reflect on how this activity will impact on clients and non-clients. Third, in setting out this case study, we hope to have provided a salutary example for lawyers and law students alike of a complex situation involving the conflict of personal ties and professional obligation, and presented an opportunity to recognise the need for vigilance and the development of skills for making sound and justifiable choices in their professional lives.
